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BOOK REVIEW
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION:

TiE NEW LEARNING.

Edited by

Harvey J. Goldschmid, H. Michael Mann & J. Fred Weston. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1974. Pp. viii, 470. $5.95.
CONGLOMERATE ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC POLICY. By Jesse W.
Markham. Boston: Division of Research, Harvard Business School,
1973. Pp. xviii, 218. $9.00.
Neither the impassioned petitions from environmentalists soliciting suspension of enforcement nor the alleged machinations of the
giant oil companies have replaced conglomeration as the ultimate
stress on antitrust. It is a subject that has triggered an outpouring

of advice and moralizing from every conceivable source. Much of
the literature can be dismissed as result oriented or vacuous. (One
wonders how many professors caught in the "publish-or-perish" corner avoided academic demise by producing a few quickies on conglomeration.) There is, however, a pocket of serious students of the
phenomenon who produce high quality papers. Jesse Markham's
ConglomerateEnterpriseand Public Policy' falls into the latter category.
The government stands on one side of the controversy as the architect of an aggressive enforcement campaign based on the assumption that the prophylactic stretch of section 7 of the Clayton Act accommodates four possible anticompetitive consequences of conglomeration: (1) structural relationships conducive to reciprocity
can result, (2) the acquired firm can derive advantages over rivals
from "deep pocket" subsidizing by the acquirer, (3) the acquirer can
eliminate itself as a potential competitor standing at the edge of the
market, and (4) aggregate concentration can be enhanced. The
government's reasoning constitutes the fashionable wisdom of the
majority.
A counterculture of dissent perceives unyielding static between
the scope of Clayton 7 and a form of merger -that does not, at least
in the short run, alter the market share statistics of the firms.
Acknowledging that in some cases it may be possible to discern adverse effects, the Neal Report nevertheless cautions that "existing
1. J. MARKHAM, CONGLOMERATE ENTERPRISE AND PUBLIC POLICY (1973)
[hereinafter cited as CONGLOMERATE ENTERPRISE].
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knowledge provides little basis for forecasting adverse effects on competition that support application"'2 of the Clayton Act. The Report
further advises that forcing the antimerger act on the enigmas of conglomeration is likely to pressure the courts into speculation or outright value judgments. 3 Representing a different philosophical base,
the Stigler Report is equally skeptical that conglomeration fits into
the antitrust mold, concluding that the main complaints about the
conglomerate relate to other things. 4
The difficulty in quantifying competitive effects has pushed the
controversy to the a priori level. In a "battle of the little black
boxes," economists compete in turning out theoretical models. Intuition is rebutted by speculation. Professor Markham's study knifes
through the clouds to grapple with facts and in the process puts in
question the credibility of the government's list of charges.
Markham notes that the purported evil genius of the conglomerate system is the synergistic effect of 2±2=5; hence, "a firm
having a 10 percent share of a dozen or so markets . . . actually

possesses greater market power in each of these markets, say the
equivalent of 15 percent

.

.

-."5 A second alleged advantage is

the "special capacity" to coordinate the behavior of the diversified
satellites so as to achieve an edge that cannot be duplicated by "independent" single-product firms. The first advantage cannot, according to Markham, be empirically tested and is, ,in any case, subsumed in the second factor. "Ultimately, therefore, whatever distinctive market power conglomerate firms may possess must derive
from the business tactics and strategies their intermarket structure
makes available to them rather than from their share of particular
markets." Specifically, do conglomerates engage in the practices of
reciprocity, cross-product subsidization, and predatory pricing?
Markham contends that the answer to this question can be found
2. P.

NEAL, REPORT OF THE WHITE HousE TASK FORCE ON ANTrIUJST

PoLIcy, 115 CONG. REc. 13890, 13894 (1969).

The "gap" in § 7 of the Clay-

ton Act was one of the factors that prompted the Task Force to recommend
a form of statutory deconcentration. Id.
3. Id. See also Austin, Conglomerate Merger: A New Source of Antitrust Tensions, 21 CASE W. RES. L. Rv. 181, 194-201 (1970).
4. G. STIGLER, PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE, REPORT ON PRODUCTIVITY AND
ComPmrrON, 115 CONG. REc. 15933 (1969); Coase, Working Paper for the

Task Force on Productivity and Competition, 115 CONG. Rnc. 15938 (1969).
The Stigler Report expressly repudiated proposals for new legislation to deal
with the conglomeration problem. G. STIGLER, supra at 15933.

5.

CONGLOMERATE ENTERPRisE

6. Id.

60.
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by studying the manner in which the organizational chart of the firm
influences its conduct. Forms of conduct, like reciprocity and subsidization, are the consequence of a deliberate decision to allocate enterprise resources among the member firms so as to achieve specific
goals. At any given instant, conglomerate firm resources are finite;
thus, the act of shifting resources means that some of the member
firms are likely to gain at the sacrifice of others. Given these constraints, optimum benefits from intraconglomerate exchanges can be
achieved only under an organizational structure that imposes on constituent firms centralized and coordinated decisionmaking.
It follows that decisionmaking autonomy at the division level
renders reciprocity and subsidization unlikely while centralization
raises a positive inference. "It is highly unlikely. . that a division
given complete autonomy over its pricing policy will compromise its
own financial performance in order to subsidize another autonomous
division's product. Moreover, divisional autonomy, when combined
with profit-center accounting and control, and a system of managerial
rewards based on financial performance, is an impediment to the
practice of reciprocity and cross-product subsidization across divisions."7
A statistical summary of 211 firms revealed that lines of managerial -responsibility function so as to refute the inference of subsidization and reciprocity. As to three key indicators, the extent of
decisional autonomization was found to be high: 71 percent of firms

delegated to divisions the power to make price decisions, 65 percent
delegated advertising authority, and 55 percent left research and development decisions at the division level." Looking at only acquired
firms, the extent of delegation was higher. Markham also discovered
that the incidence of trade relations department operations-thought
to be highly "suggestive" of reciprocity-was low: only 16 percent
of responding firms maintained such departments. 9
By self-admission, Markham throws only "modest light" on the
potential competition problem.10 His statistics cut at the underpinnings of the assumption that if denied entry by acquisition,
diversifiers will enter the same market de novo. In only 79 of 745
diversifying acquisitions did the firms first consider de novo entry as
a viable alternative. He concludes that "in by far the vast majority
7. Id. at 171.
8. Id. at 69.
9. Id. at 78.
10. Id. at 125.
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of cases of conglomerate acquisition the acquiring firm is not a potential competitor lurking on the border of the acquired company's
market, seriously contemplating entry by the internal expansion
route."'

Finally, Markham concludes that conglomeration has thus far not
adversely affected market structure. Increases and decreases in con2
centration in three- and four-digit SIC industries have balanced out.'
When the government's sociopolitical anticonglomerate argument
that conglomeration enhances aggregate concentration was put to the
test of factual verification, the same result emerged: "the conglomerate merger wave appears to have had no measurable effect on the
overall structure of the manufacturing economy."' 13
Convinced -that in fact diversified firms function no differently
than undiversified firms, Markham repudiates resort to a "special
antitrust policy." The proper target, reachable under present standards, is "intolerable market power without special regard to the product diversity of its corporate residence."' 14
The dilemma confronting all who deal in the cryptology of conglomeration is the inability to establish a solid empirical position that
would end the bickering and lead to a consensus on policy. Markham does not make a clean break out of the dilemma. He has compiled a convincing study that effectively counters the faddish 2+2
=5 conglomerate math; he does not, however, completely rout the
opposition. His conclusions on conglomerate behavior are couched
in terms of inferences derived from statistics describing the allocation
of decisionmaking authority. Given the lacuna between probable
managerial strategy and what firms in fact do, that large body of
critics who have a heavy investment in -their own conglomerate portfolio are not likely to give Markham's study the credit that it deserves.

Critics can also avoid the thrust of his findings on concentration
by pointing to the short time frame of the study and noting that the
deleterious effects of the conglomerate wave are too subtle to cause
short-run ripples in market structures. This is a reasonable criticism;
as Markham acknowledges, the length of time necessary for a reliable reading is an issue over which reasonable men will differ.' 5
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

126.
169.
177.
175.
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The more zealous addicts of the "outer limits" use of Clayton
7 will simply ignore the study. This faction of the establishment considers proscription appropriate whenever an acquisition creates a
structural opportunity to engage in subsidization or reciprocity. It
is the potential for the opportunity that constitutes the violation.
Hence a study like Markham's that endeavors to get a fix on the
past and the present so as to project reality is irrelevant to those who
develop policy based on horoscopes of the intentions lurking deep
in the management psyche.
Digging into the lacuna between inference and fact nourishes the
economist's intellect and wallet. Books, papers, and studies issue
forth that either detail the proper method for confirming assumptions
or that describe a slice of reality purportedly in line with theoretical
formulation. Industrial Concentration: The New Learning0 is a
product of this eternal commitment. During 1974, a group of economists and lawyers met to discuss -the state of the empirical support
for the structure-conduct-performance model. At issue was the extent and the quality of the influence that market concentration exerts
on economies of scale, advertising, profits, innovation, and inflation.
Most of the nation's big names in industrial organization economics had their say in a debate format. Scherer concludes that
scale economies exist but are "exhausted at relatively modest concentration levels in many manufacturing industries ....
,'7 McGee
counters -that most of the studies on economies are incomplete, "at
least as likely to mislead as to inform."' 8 As to advertising, Yale
Brozen says that it increases competition, that there is "indirect evidence whose weight leans toward -the conclusion that advertising increases elasticity."'19 Mann disputes this, contending that theory suggests -a positive relationship between advertising, oligopoly, and high
profits. He adds: "The evidence favors the -theorizing, although the
exact cause and effect linkages among the variables eludes a priori
argument at present, and empirical work as a tool for discriminating
among alternative theories has barely begun." ' 20 On the issue of
16. INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEw LEARNiNG, (H. Goldschmid,
H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION].

17. Scherer, Economics of Scale and Industrial Concentration, in INDus16, 51-52.
18. McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Size, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 55, 68.
19. Brozen, Entry Barriers: Advertising and Product Differentiation, in
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 115, 130.
20. Mann, Advertising, Concentration, and Profitability: The State of
TRIAL CONCENTRATION
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whether concentration and firm size are necessary to support innovation, the ubiquitous Jesse Markham observes that the evidence is inconclusive and cautions that on "a purely academic level, no professor of industrial organization could justify dismissing lightly the
Schumpeterian alternative theory of industrial behavior on the
'21
grounds that it flies in the face of the available factual evidence."
22
Mueller contends that concentration feeds .inflation; Weston and
Lustgarten combine to repudiate and label false the "popular generalization about the positive relation between concentration and
'23
price increases.
The most critical debate centers on the cornerstone assumption
that high concentration produces poor performance in the form of
supracompetitive prices. Weiss summarizes 46 studies, concluding
that a positive connection between concentration and profits confirms
the theoretical assumptions on the linkage between structure, conduct, and performance.2 4

Demsetz' treatment is two-pronged; he

contends that for various reasons relating to methodology, the structuralist studies stand discredited. His other argument is that by using
the oligopoly behavior models to mirror single-firm monopoly theory,
the structuralists have appropriated into their model the same defect
that self-destructs -the monopoly model-both models assume that
monopoly power exists, but do not explain how such power is ac25
quired and maintained.
Throughout the debate, the "truths" of the "new learning" are
muffled from either the cacophony of competing empirical studies or
the smoke that swirls around the nit-picking guerrilla warfare over
methodology. This is not to suggest that the overall influence of
structuralism is neutralized by countervailing views. While the editors of the book have compiled a balanced presentation of opposing
views, in the actual world of microeconomics, the majority of the
population is composed of structuralists.
Knowledge and Directions for Public Policy, in INDUSTRI&L. CONCENTRATION

137, 155.
21. Markham, Concentration, A Stimulus or Retardant to Innovation?, in
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 247, 267-68.
22. Mueller, Industrial Concentration: An Important Inflationary Force?,
in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 280.
23. Weston & Lustgarten, Concentration and Wage-Price Change, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 307, 330.
24. Weiss, The Concentration-ProfitsRelationship in Antitrust, in INDusTRIAL CoNCENTRTION 184.
25. Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 164.
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The structuralists have not relied on a mere superiority in
numbers to overcome the various weaknesses in their studies or to
blunt the efforts of the opposition. They have instead proselytized
the "truths" of abstract models, and shoved to the background the
debate over the crevices and leaks in the empirical studies. The
most impressionable disciples of the campaign have been the antitrust enforcement agencies and the judiciary. With perception, government lawyers recognized the advantages to be gained by engulfing an unfathomable fact situation under -the blanket of an a priori
model whose assumptions on competitive effects fall within the
sweeping antitrust proscriptive standards. The intercourse between
oligopoly theory and the "probability" standard of Clayton 7 has
been particularly productive. By theoretical pronouncement, oligopoly breeds poor competitive conditions: thus a merger producing
oligopoly is proscribable as demonstrating a "probability" of a lessening of competition. Not content with the sweep of this approach,
the Justice Department argued in U.S. v. Von's Grocery Co., 26 that
oligopoly has no lower limits, thus any merger contributes to
2
oligopoly and is, by implication, proscribableY.7
The courts have been the third-party beneficiaries of the government's "new learning." Economic theory is especially seductive to
trial judges, to whom the antitrust case and the accompanying "enormous, nearly cancerous growth of exhibits, depositions, and ore tenus
testimony" 28 are anathema. Unintelligible testimony and carloads of
documents become less burdensome when economic theory is available for tutoring. Most importantly, the assumptions of theory give
the courts a manageable set of presumptions. Thus, once the facts
29
confirm an oligopoly structure, the court presumes adverse effects.
26. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
27. It is no answer to say that a merger need not be forbidden unless
it actually creates oligopoly. For there is no magic point at which
oligopoly springs full-blown into existence. Between the highly fragmented and the tightly concentrated market structure there is a middle area, one broad part of which is certainly a danger zone. No
one can say-at least not without an inquiry far broader and deeper
than practical law enforcement permits-at precisely what point a
particular market will exhibit oligopolistic behavior. It is thus meaningless to speak of allowing firms to merge up to the lower limit of
oligopoly; practically speaking, that limit is unascertainable.
Brief for Appellant at 23, United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270

(1966).
28. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 247 (D.R.I. 1964).
29. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 595 (1967) (Harlan,
J., concurring).
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As the Markham book suggests, structural theories have achieved
the greatest success in the hostilities against conglomeration. Indeed,
it can be said that from the conglomerate campaign evolved the Principle of Antitrust Inversity: the less the ability to confirm or ascertain the facts of competitive injury, the greater the reliance on economic theory.
In broad context, the Principle of Antitrust Inversity is compatible with the lifestyle of the "postindustrial society." In today's postindustrial system, planning is the critical factor in achieving and
maintaining success.30 The brute size of the typical enterprise, the
heavy capital investment, and a generous commitment to research
and development put the mark of disaster on errors of judgment.
Effective planning is enhanced by the development of sophisticated
management techniques and the remarkable advances in technology.
It is technology, however, that generates the contradiction. At near
exponential rates technology produces, absorbs, and renders obsolete
great quantities of facts. Computers spew out "empirical" studiesand counterstudies. The consequence is that technology both enhances and obstructs planning. The contradiction is resolved by resort to the theoretical model, and the industrial planner, like the
judge, looks to theory to manage facts and convert system out of
chaos. "What has become decisive for the organization of decisions
and the direction of change is the centrality of 1theoretical knowledge-the primacy of theory over empiricism and the codification of
knowledge into abstract systems of symbols that

.

. .

can be used

to illuminate many different and varied areas of experience."'3 1
The New Learning concludes with a debate over reform. The
committed structuralist holds statutory deconcentration to be the
30. Planning exists because [the market] process has ceased to be reliable. Technology, with its companion commitment of time and
capital, means that the needs of the consumer must be anticipatedby months or years. When the distant day arrives the consumer's
willingness to buy may well be lacking. By the same token, while
common labor and carbon steel will be forthcoming in response to
a promise to pay, the specialized skills and arcane materials required
by advanced technology cannot similarly be counted upon. The
needed action in both instances is evident: in addition to deciding
what the consumer will want and will pay, the firm must take every
feasible step to see that what it decides to produce is wanted by the
consumer at a remunerative price. And it must see that the labor,
materials and equipment that it needs will be available at a cost consistent with the price it will recieve. It must exercise control over
what is sold. It must exercise control over what is supplied. It must
replace the market with planning.
J. GALERAmrH, THm NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE 23-24 (1967).
31. D. BELL, TnE ComG oF POsT-NDUSTnuAL Socmriy 20 (1973).
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3 and
remedy, with the Kaysen-Turner proposal,32 the Neal Report,"
3
4
the Hart bill, serving as models. At this point a switch in tactics
occurs; the structuralist self-transforms into the political economist
and cites sociopolitical value judgments as justifications for the deconcentration program. The prospect of political and social tyranny
by the giant corporation along with other indictments from the days
of Senator Sherman are uncorked to justify drastic surgery. Thus,
in the showdown, the structuralist acknowledges that the state of
knowledge in the field of microeconomics is too unsettled and too
underdeveloped to resolve conclusively the doubts over the tradeoffs from deconcentration.

ARTHUR

D. AusTiN 1[*

32. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, AN RusT POLIcy 265-72 (1959).
33. The Concentrated Industries Act, in P. NEAL, supra note 2, at 13897,
reprinted in INDusTRIAL CONCENTRATION 449.
34. The Industrial ReorganizAtion Act, S. 1167, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), reprinted in INDusrRu&x CoNCENTn&TION 444.

* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.

